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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN THE MARKET FOR UNION REPRESENTATION 
Matthew T. Bodie

 
Symposium: Whither the Board?  The National Labor Relations Board at 75 
 As we celebrate (and fret over) the seventy fifth anniversary of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA),
1
 I want to focus on one of the more famous doctrines of the Act‟s rich 
history.  In General Shoe Corp.,
2
 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) 
established what is known as the “laboratory conditions” doctrine.  Using a memorable turn of 
phrase, the Board stated: “In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a 
laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as 
possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”3  The image of a laboratory 
being used to determine “uninhibited desires” has always been wonderfully incongruous to me.  
But the metaphor has lasted.  Over one thousand Board and federal court decisions refer to the 
“laboratory conditions” doctrine,4 and it is still the touchstone for determining whether the 
results of a representation election are enforced.  Under this doctrine, the Board may order that 
                                                          

 Associate Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  I would like to thank FIU College of Law, Dean Alex 
Acosta, Professor Kerri Stone, and the FIU Law Review for the opportunity to participate in this terrific symposium.  
I am also grateful to Harold A. Maier, Resident Officer of the Board‟s Miami office, for his commentary on the 
paper. 
1
 Brooding over the current state of labor law has become a cherished part of NLRA anniversary celebrations.  See, 
e.g., Benjamin Aaron, The NLRB, Labor Courts, and Industrial Tribunals: A Selective Comparison, 39 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 35, 45 (1985) (“It must be admitted that after 50 years, the Board still has not succeeded in 
providing adequate protection of the right to organize and to bargain collectively, in developing effective remedies 
against unfair labor practices, or in substantially reducing its ever-rising backlog of cases.”); James J. Brudney, 
Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1563 (1996) (“Sixty years after 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was passed, collective action appears moribund.”); David L. Gregory & 
Raymond T. Mak, Significant Decisions of the NLRB, 1984: The Reagan Board's „Celebration‟ of 
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the NLRA, 18 CONN. L.REV. 7, 8-9 (1985) (“Although neither the Board, the Act, nor 
labor law is irreversibly in extremis at this half-century crossroads, troublesome indicia are present.”).  The title of 
this conference calls to mind one of the more famous of these reflections.  Michael H. Gottesman, Wither Goest 
Labor Law: Law and Economics in the Workplace, 100 YALE L.J. 2767 (1991) (“The long and steady decline in the 
percentage of private-sector employees represented by unions -- a decline now in its fourth decade -- preoccupies all 
thinking about American labor law today.”). 
2
 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948). 
3
 Id. at 127. 
4
 A Westlaw search on May 21, 2010 for laboratory conditions within the same sentence as election ("laboratory 
conditions" /s election) returned 788 results in the FLB-NLRB database and 260 results in the ALLFEDS database. 
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an election be vacated and conducted anew if the winning party violated the laboratory 
conditions through its pre-election conduct. 
 The laboratory conditions doctrine suggests an active and vigorous role for the Board in 
providing employees with the proper election environment.  After all, it seems like a fairly 
arduous task to provide an experimental laboratory with “conditions as nearly ideal as possible.”  
And indeed, the Board has an extensive list of prohibited conduct: threatening speech, 
interrogations, polling, surveillance, promises of improved conditions, grants of benefits, and 
inflammatory appeals.
5
  However, the Board has been largely reactive in its regulation, keeping 
out certain sources of election impurities but doing little to assist employees in their decision. .  
There is reason to doubt that employees are getting the information they need when making their 
representation decision.
6
  At present, the Board does little to  ensure that such information is 
available.
7
  It would be well within the Board‟s current role as election regulator to make sure 
that employees have easy access to the information they need. 
 In this symposium contribution, I examine how the Board could use a mandatory 
disclosure regime to provide information to employees when making their representation 
decision.  In Part I, I discuss the information already disclosed through the NLRA as well as the 
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act) and 
                                                          
5
 See MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 317-62 (6th ed. 2007) 
(providing an overview of campaign regulation). 
6
 Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 4, 45-69 (2008).  See 
also Catherine L. Fisk, Thoughts on Treating Union Representation Processes as a Market in Need of Legally 
Required Disclosure of Information, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 7 (March 24, 2008) (discussing “the substantial 
information problems that already exist in the [election] process”); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Rent-to-Own Unionism?, 94 
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 9, 9 (March 24, 2008) (discussing the “information deficiencies implicated by union 
elections”); Harry G. Hutchison, The Market for Union Representation: An Information Deficit or Rational 
Behavior?, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 15, 16 (March 24, 2008) (discussing how information “may help workers make 
a free and reasoned choice”); Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers‟ Rights: The 
Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (arguing that workers must “have access to 
information relevant to making informed decisions” in order to be autonomous). 
7
 Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Communication Breakdown: Reviving the Role of Discourse in the Regulation of Employee 
Collective Action, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. __, Working Paper at 2 (forthcoming 2011) (noting that the value of 
employee communication to the representation process is “badly undervalued”). 
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federal securities laws.  In Part II, I discuss how the Board could pair this information with a 
limited scheme of information disclosure to provide a base level of election-related information 
to employees.  I conclude with thoughts on the way forward. 
PART I: DISCLOSURE UNDER CURRENT LAW 
A. Disclosure under the NLRA 
 At present, the Board places no disclosure requirements on unions or employers in the 
context of a union representation campaign.  In fact, it has held that even extreme circumstances 
do not require parties to disclose.  In Florida Mining & Materials Corp., the only case to 
examine this issue at length, the petitioning union – a Teamsters local – had been placed into 
receivership by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) the day before the 
representation election.
8
  Evidence gathered after the fact, through internal union documents as 
well as press coverage, indicated that the takeover was triggered by “an irreconcilable conflict 
between the top union officers which rendered the local unable to function.”9  Further, the IBT‟s 
letter announcing the takeover stated that: “Unless immediate action is taken, it cannot be 
assured that the Local Union will be able to fulfill its duties as bargaining representative or to 
carry out the other legitimate objects of a labor organization.”10  As a result of the takeover, all 
officers and business agents of the local were replaced.  In a newspaper interview after the 
takeover, the IBT-appointed trustee reported that “financial mismanagement” had left the local 
$18,000 in debt, and he “expressed doubt about the continued existence of the local.”11  
However, the article also described picketing at the union headquarters by union members who 
                                                          
8
 Fla. Mining & Materials Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1972), enforced 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973). 
9
 Fla. Mining & Materials Corp. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 65, 66 (5th Cir. 1973). 
10
 Id.   
11
 Id. at 66-67. 
were “greatly disturbed by both the imposition of the trusteeship and the firing of officers and 
agents.”12 
 The employer objected to the election under the laboratory conditions doctrine 
based on the union‟s failure to disclose this information.  The employer alleged that this 
receivership signified the local‟s precarious financial status, and that as a result the local 
would be unqualified to properly represent the bargaining unit.
13
  The Board affirmed the 
regional director‟s decision overruling the employer‟s objections,14 and the Fifth Circuit 
enforced the order to bargain.
15
  Noting that an affirmative disclosure rule “has never 
been formulated or imposed in any reported case,” the Board argued to the court that such 
a rule would not make sense.
16
  Although it found the case to present “an extremely close 
question,” the Fifth Circuit found that the Board had not abused its discretion, noting that 
the unusual proximity between the takeover and the election likely rendered this situation 
“a unique problem.”17 
 The Board‟s arguments against disclosure in Florida Mining follow a familiar set of 
concerns with any disclosure regime.  First, the Board contended that setting up such a regime 
                                                          
12
 Id. at 67. 
13
 Fla. Mining, 198 N.L.R.B. at 601-02. 
14
 The Regional Director‟s opinion and Board order affirming that opinion were not published.  The Board did 
publish its summary enforcement of the § 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain.  Id. at 603-04. 
15
 Florida Mining & Materials Corp. v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 65 (5th Cir. 1973). 
16
 Id. at 67. 
17
 Id. at 69.  In explaining its decision, the court stated: 
It appears to the court that employees should have the right to know prior to voting for a union that 
at least for a short time actual control of the day to day administration of the local was to be 
handled by a representative of the International, not by those people whom the employees had 
understood to be the heads of the local. On the other hand, we fully recognize the administrative 
difficulties which would follow from a rule designed to cover this case. Furthermore, we agree 
that recalcitrant employers would take advantage of the situation and file meaningless challenges 
in an effort to further delay implementation of the desires of the employees. Since ours is not a 
duty to resolve these intricate competing interests but only to review the initial decision of the 
administrative body, we do not feel we have to analyze and balance these competing factors in 
detail. 
Id. at 70. 
would entail “great difficulty in determining the scope and extent of an affirmative disclosure 
rule.”18  Once the regime was established, moreover, “losing parties would be quick to take 
advantage of any such rule in an effort to avoid the consequences of a free election.”19  Second, 
the Board fell back on its “neutral umpire” role:  
Under the campaign processes as they now exist, the competing arguments pro 
and con on unionization are left to be presented by the parties.  The employer, 
because of supposed financial and entrepreneurial disadvantages flowing from 
unionization, is assigned the role of bringing the alleged negative aspects of 
unionization to the attention of the electorate.  Likewise, the union is to stress its 
advantages.  The Board, as referee, steps in only in the case of low blows, and 
even then only when the injured party does not have sufficient time to present a 
response.
20
 
Essentially, the Board disclaims any duty to provide employees with the information they need 
to make a decision; this role is left to the parties.   
 Third, even if the Board were to supply the information relevant to the election, it would 
be unsure of what this information would be.
21
  According to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he Board 
actually admits that in all likelihood the voter's choice is „too often inescapably non-rational.‟”22  
The court was left to suss out the ramifications of this view: “the Board seems to be saying that 
specific information is rarely, if ever, important to an employee faced with a unionization 
vote.”23  Fourth and finally, the Board argued that the information in this particular case – the 
trusteeship – was not all that relevant to the representation decision.  The Board framed the issue 
as one of internal union governance, and argued that “studies of employee non-participation 
                                                          
18
 Id. at 67. 
19
 Id.   
20
 Id. at 67-68. 
21
 Id. at 68 (“[The Board] argues that no one knows what diverse information the electorate might find useful in 
assessing the pros and cons of unionism.”). 
22
 For this proposition, the Board apparently relied on Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in 
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 38, 65 (1964). See Fla. Mining, 
481 F.2d at 68. 
23
 Id.  
amply illustrate that democratic participation in union affairs is not an important concern of 
voters.”24 
 In my view, none of these arguments are persuasive.  Yes, administrative costs could be 
daunting, but it all depends on how the disclosure requirement is framed.  The Board could 
require disclosure and still remain a “neutral umpire,” in the same way agencies such as the EPA, 
the FDA, and the SEC face similar requirements.  But more importantly, according to its own 
standard the Board is not really supposed to be an umpire – it is supposed to be establishing 
laboratory conditions.
25
  It needs to see itself as an advocate for the employees, not a referee in a 
contest between union and employer.
26
  The “irrational” trope seems nihilistic and 
condescending; can it really be that we don‟t know anything about what information employees 
want?  In fact, the Board seems to contradict this in its final argument, which claims that 
employees don‟t really care if the union is going into trusteeship.  I do not share the Board‟s 
sanguinity on this.  The Teamsters‟ decision to take over the local demonstrates something about 
the ability of the local to do its job well. 
 Florida Mining remains a footnote to history, if that.  The Board has never really 
seriously considered implementing a regime of information disclosure.  The only required 
disclosure in the election context is procedural in nature.  Under the Excelsior doctrine, 
employers must disclose the names and addresses of employees in the unit to the union after an 
                                                          
24
 Id.  The court appears to have disagreed somewhat on the ramifications of trusteeship.  Id. (“We do note, however, 
that the Board admits the revelation of the trusteeship would have brought to light all of the problems present in the 
administration of this local.”).  
25
 As I have argued previously, this failure to insure that the employee receives the proper level of information “does 
not comport with the laboratory conditions model, where information would play a critical role in establishing the 
conditions for a fair and reasoned choice.”  Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 24. 
26
 For more on the problems with the “political election” model, see Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: 
Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993); Bodie, Information, supra 
note 6, at 31-34, 45-69. 
election petition has been filed.
27
  This Excelsior requirement gives the union the ability to 
provide information to employees, and it was justified on that basis.
28
  However, the Board has 
yet to expand this requirement to include phone numbers or email addresses.
29
  And the Board 
provides no formal method to channel information from unions and employers to employees.
30
 
 The only other example of information disclosure relating to elections under Board law is 
the recent requirement imposed by Dana Corp., that employees be informed of their right to file 
a decertification petition within forty-five days of the employer‟s voluntary recognition of the 
union.
31
  If employees never receive notice of their right to file such a petition, then the Board 
will not apply the “voluntary recognition” election bar to prevent employees from filing a 
decertification petition.
32
  Like Excelsior, this notification requirement pertains more to 
procedure than substance.  It simply requires that employees be informed of one of the rights 
they can exercise under the Act before those rights can be limited through the recognition bar.
33
  
If they are not so informed, then those rights will not be limited. 
 In short, the Board has no history of mandatory information disclosure and has evinced 
little desire to create one.  However, I would argue that this reluctance is based on outdated, 
overblown, and even offensive policy judgments that should be reconsidered in this new century.  
                                                          
27
 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1239–40 (1966) (requiring that the information must be given to 
the union within seven days of the approval of an election agreement).   
28
 Id. at 1242 (“[A]n employee who has had an effective opportunity to hear the arguments concerning 
representation is in a better position to make a more fully informed and reasonable choice. Accordingly, we think 
that it is appropriate for us to remove the impediment to communication to which our new rule is directed.”).   
29
  See  G. Micah Wissinger, Informing Workers of the Right to Workplace Representation: Reasonably Moving from 
the Middle of the Highway to the Information Superhighway, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331, 342–43 (2003) (proposing 
that unions be given private employee email addresses as part of the Excelsior disclosure). 
30
 For discussions of the limitations of employee communication and discourse, see Bodie, Information, supra note 
6, at 23-24; Hirsch, supra note 7. 
31
 In re Dana Corp., 353 N.L.R.B. 434, 434 (2007). 
32
 Id. (“[N]o election bar will be imposed after a card-based recognition unless (1) employees in the bargaining unit 
receive notice of the recognition and of their right, within 45 days of the notice, to file a decertification petition or to 
support the filing of a petition by a rival union, and (2) 45 days pass from the date of notice without the filing of a 
valid petition.”). 
33
 Id,  
And if the Board were interested in ensuring that employees get a baseline of information 
necessary to making their decision, it could bootstrap onto other disclosure regimes that provide 
a lot of relevant data.  The Board would not have to start from scratch. 
B. Disclosure under the LMRDA 
 Although a regime of information disclosure would be new for the union representation 
campaign, it would not be new for the unions themselves.  The Board regulates the relationship 
between union and employers and creates the regulatory regime for the initial choice by 
employees of whether to join a union.  The Department of Labor, on the other hand, oversees the 
management and organization of the union itself, including internal union elections and a union‟s 
relationship with its members.  While the NLRB may not require disclosure in the representation 
election context, the Department of Labor requires unions to provide extensive disclosure to their 
members.
 34
  This disclosure is required under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act (LMRDA or Landrum-Griffin Act), and covers much of the union‟s internal governance and 
finances.  A system of mandatory disclosure in the representation context could piggyback off 
the existing LMRDA system as long as there is overlap between the two sets of disclosures.
 
 
 Since 1960 the Department of Labor has provided forms through which unions meet the 
disclosure requirements under Landrum-Griffin.  Form LM-1 provides for disclosure of dues, 
                                                          
34
 In many ways, the split between the two systems resembles the split in regulation of the sale of securities.  The 
federal system of required disclosure for the sale of corporate securities proceeds largely in two steps.  First, before a 
firm decides to offer a security for sale, it must proffer extensive information about itself, its finances, its prospects, 
the expected price, and other information deemed relevant to potential buyers.  Second, once the security has been 
sold to initial buyers and thereafter is traded on the public markets, firms have a continuing obligation to disclose 
relevant financial information, insider transactions, executive compensation, and other matters relevant to the 
security‟s value.  Each step is established largely by one of the New Deal securities acts: the Securities Act of 1933 
is primarily about initial disclosure, while the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 primarily concerns the trading of 
securities on public markets. THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION [ch. 1] (4th ed. 
2002).  In this respect, as in the market for union representation, there are two disclosure paradigms: one for the 
initial “purchase” and one for “members” after purchase. 
fees, and organizational structure under section 201(a) of the Act.
35
   Forms LM-2, LM-3, and 
LM-4 are the annual reports that cover a union‟s organizational and financial disclosure under 
LMRDA section 201(a) and (b).
36
  Form LM-2 is the form for largest unions; the amounts 
changed over time, but 2003 amendments placed the threshold at unions with receipts of 
$250,000 or more.
37
  The Department of Labor estimates that while only twenty percent of 
unions meet this threshold, these unions received about ninety-three percent of the total dollars 
received annually by unions.
38
  Forms LM-3 and LM-4 are simplified for smaller unions.
39
  
Along with these annual forms are specific forms for certain types of disclosures.  Form LM-30 
pertains to potential conflicts of interest on the part of union employees or their families.  Form 
LM-10 requires employers to disclose payments made to unions.  Unions under trusteeship must 
also file a specific set of forms.
40
   
As it happens, I am writing this contribution in the midst of administrative change.  
During the Bush Administration, the Department of Labor gave many of these forms their first 
significant overhaul in more than forty years.
41
  These changes were challenged in court and 
partially struck down.
42
  Amendments to the regulation made by the Bush Administration 
Department of Labor were published in the Federal Register the day after President Obama‟s 
inauguration.
43
  The Obama Department of Labor is now in the process of undoing some of these 
                                                          
35
 29 C.F.R. §§ 402.2-402.3 (2006). 
36
 29 U.S.C. § 431 (2006). 
37
 29 C.F.R. § 403.2(d) (2006). 
38
 Recent Regulation: Department of Labor Increases Union Financial Reporting Requirements, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
1734, 1736 (2004) [hereinafter Recent Regulation]. 
39
 Form LM-3 is a four-page report for unions with receipts less than $200,000, 29 C.F.R. § 403.4(a)(1) (2006), and 
Form LM-4 is a two-page report for unions with receipts of less than $10,000, id. § 403.4(a)(2). 
40
 See Forms LM-15, 29 C.F.R. §§ 408.3, 408.4 (2006); LM-15A, 29 C.F.R. §§ 408.4, 408.8 (2006);LM-16, 29 
C.F.R. § 408.8 (2006). 
41
 See 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374 (Oct. 9, 2003). 
42
 AFL-CIO v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
43
 74 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
changes.
44
  What follows is a more detailed discussion of the disclosure requirements provided 
for by the Department of Labor‟s current regulations.  The reader is cautioned, however, that 
further changes may soon be forthcoming. 
1. Dues and Fees 
  The LMRDA evinces a key interest in the regulation of union dues and fees.  Section 
101(a)(3) of the Act provides that local dues can only be increased through a secret ballot 
majority vote of the membership.
45
  Section 201(a) requires unions to provide information on 
“the initiation fee or fees required” as well as “the regular dues or fees or other periodic 
payments required to remain a member.”46  Form LM-1 requires that the union set forth its dues 
and fees structure as an initial matter.
47
  Forms LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 provide for the annual 
disclosure of the dues and fees required by the union for members.
48
  The categories are regular 
dues and fees, initiation fees, transfer fees, and work permits.
49
 
2. Organizational Structure 
Section 201(a) of the LMRDA requires unions to provide the Department of Labor with a 
copy of its constitution and bylaws.
50
  In addition, the union is required to file a report providing: 
the names and titles of union officers;the union‟s dues and fees structure; and detailed statements 
about the union‟s procedures for such matters as qualifications for or restrictions on membership, 
                                                          
44
 See 74 Fed. Reg. 52,401, 52,402 (Oct. 13, 2009) (discussing the proposed changes). 
45
 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(3) (2006).  Dues for federation of national or international labor organizations can only be 
raised through a majority vote of the delegates voting at a convention, a majority vote in a membership referendum 
conducted by secret ballot, or as an interim matter, by majority vote of the members of the executive board.  Id. 
46
 29 U.S.C. § 431(a)(3)-(4) (2006). 
47
 Form LM-1 Labor Organization Information Report 2,  
http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/GPEA_Forms/lm-1p.pdf. 
48
 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/lm2_blankForm.pdf; 
Form LM-3 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/lm3_blankForm.pdf; 
Form LM-4 Labor Organization Annual Report 2, 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm4_blankForm.pdf. 
49
 Form LM-2, supra note 46, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 46 , at 2.  Form LM-2 also includes a category for 
“working” dues and fees, as opposed to regular dues and fees.  Form LM-2, supra note 46, at 2.  Form LM-4 only 
requires the union to report any changes in its dues or fees structure.  Form LM-4, supra note 46, at 2. 
50
 29 U.S.C. § 431(a) (2000). 
authorization for disbursement of funds, audit of financial transactions of the labor organization, 
the calling of regular and special meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, disciplinary 
fines and suspensions, authorization for bargaining demands, ratification of contract terms, and 
authorization for strikes.
51
  
Form LM-1 provides for the disclosure of this information and must be filed with 90 days 
of when a union becomes subject to the LMRDA.
52
   Along with its constitution and bylaws, the 
union must prepare a report citing to the page, section, or paragraph number of the governing 
documents that cover the procedures discussed in the statute itself, such as qualifications for or 
restrictions on membership and authorization for disbursement of funds.
53
  The initial report also 
requires the union to list its officers, as well as the date of the next election.
54
  In its annual 
financial report, the union is required to list all of its officers,
55
 the date of its next election of 
officers,
56
 and the number of members it has.
57
  
3. Financial Disclosure 
LMRDA § 201(b) requires that unions file annual reports, signed by the president and 
treasurer, disclosing details about the union‟s financial condition and operations.58  Specifically, 
the Act requires disclosure of assets and liabilities, receipts during the year and sources for the 
receipts, salaries, and other disbursements for all officers and employees making more than 
$10,000, loans of more than $250 to officers and employees, all loans to business enterprises, 
                                                          
51
 Id. 
52
 Form LM-1, supra note 46. 
53
 29 C.F.R. § 402.1 (2010); Form LM-1, supra note 46, at 3. 
54
 Form LM-1, supra note 46, at 2. 
55
 Form LM-2, supra note 46, at Schedule 11; Form LM-3, supra note 46, at 3. 
56
 Form LM-2, supra note 46, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 46, at 2. 
57
 Form LM-2, supra note 64, at 2; Form LM-3, supra note 46, at 2; Form LM-4, supra note 46, at 2. 
58
 29 U.S.C. § 431(b) (2006). 
and “other disbursements made by [the union].”59   The Secretary of the Department of Labor is 
given authority to prescribe the rules and regulations for filing the annual reports.
60
 
Prior to the 2003 changes, the Department of Labor asked unions to disclose their overall 
assets and liabilities, as well as their general receipts and disbursements.
61
  Under the 2003 
changes, unions who file the LM-2 are not only required to list their general receipts and 
disbursements, but to itemize them as well (for amounts greater than $5,000).
62
  Separate 
schedules provide for the itemization of accounts receivable,
63
 loans receivable,
64
 investments 
and fixed assets,
65
 and other assets and liabilities.
66
  Unions also must itemize individual receipts 
and disbursements made to support particular union functions, such as contract negotiation and 
administration, organizing, and political activities.
67
  In addition to these itemizations, unions 
must break down the time each officer or employee spends on the various activities of the 
organization.
68
 
The 2003 changes to the financial disclosure forms largely remain in place.
69
  However, 
on the day after President Obama‟s inauguration, the Department of Labor published a new set of 
                                                          
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. § 438. 
61
 See Recent Regulation, supra note 36, at 1735. 
62
 68 Fed. Reg. 58,374, 58,429-30 (Oct. 9, 2003). 
63
 See 2003 Form LM-2 (copy on file with author). 
64
 Id. at Schedule 2. 
65
 Id. at Schedule 3 (sales of investments and fixed assets); id. at Schedule 4 (purchases of investments and fixed 
assets); id. at Schedule 5 (investments); Schedule 6 (fixed assets). 
66
 Id. at Schedule 7 (other assets); id. at Schedule 10 (other liabilities). 
67
 See id.  Schedule 14 covers “other receipts,” schedule 15 covers “contract negotiation and administration,” 
schedule 16 covers “organizing,” schedule 17 covers “political activities,” schedule 18 covers “lobbying,” schedule 
19 covers “contributions, gifts, and grants,” schedule 20 covers “benefits,” schedule 21 covers “general overhead,” 
and schedule 22 covers “other disbursements.”  See also Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report 18, 
http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/lm2_blankForm.pdf.  
68
 68 Fed. Reg. at 58,471; Form LM-2, supra note 46, at Schedule 11. 
69
 In AFL-CIO v. Chao, 409 F.3d 377 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the court upheld the changes to the LM-2, but struck down 
Form T-1, a supplemental form regarding general trust reporting.  The court found that Form T-1 exceeded the 
Department‟s authority.  Id. at 378.  The Department recently proposed rescinding the T-1 and moving some of the 
required disclosure into the LM-2.  75 Fed. Reg. 5456 (Feb. 2, 2010). 
rules requiring even further financial disclosure.
70
  The new rules required unions to disclose 
additional information in the context of asset and investment transactions, disbursements to 
officers and employees, and itemization of certain categories of receipts.
71
  However, this rule 
had been rescinded by the Department in October 2003.
72
  The Department argued that a more 
thorough investigation on the effects of the 2003 changes to the LM-2 was  needed before 
additional changes to the form shwere made.
73
   
4. Conflicts of Interest. 
 Much of the work of the McClellan Committee – a precursor to Landrum-Griffin – 
focused on widespread graft and self-dealing by union officials.
74
  Section 202 of the LMRDA 
requires union officers and employees to disclose a wide array of potential conflicts of interest.
75
  
These disclosures include any financial interests held by an employee in a business represented 
by the union, any transactions between such a business and a union employee, and any payments 
made by a represented business to the union or its employees.  The statute is very specific:  A 
union employee must disclose, for example, “any transaction in which he or his spouse or minor 
child engaged, directly or indirectly, involving any stock, bond, security, or loan to or from, or 
other legal or equitable interest in the business of an employer whose employees such labor 
organization represents or is actively seeking to represent.”76  Similarly, all transactions must be 
disclosed “except work performed and payments and benefits received as a bona fide employee 
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 74 Fed. Reg. 3678 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
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 Id.; see also 74 Fed. Reg. 52,401, 52,402 (Oct. 13, 2009) (discussing the proposed changes). 
72
 74 Fed. Reg. at 52,402. 
73
 Id. at 52,402, 52,409.  The Department also rescinded the rules regarding the Department‟s ability to revoke a 
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moves.  Elaine L. Chao, Obama Tries to Stop Union Disclosure, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2009. 
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 Benjamin Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 883 
(1960) (discussing “the sordid record, gathered by the McClellan Committee, of the misuse of union funds by some 
officers and employees”). 
75
 29 U.S.C. § 432 (2006). 
76
 Id. § 432(a)(2). 
of such employer and except purchases and sales of goods or services in the regular course of 
business at prices generally available to any employee of such employer.”77   
Employers have their own set of disclosures related to conflicts of interest.  The LMRDA 
requires that employers disclose any payments made to union officials or employees – a 
reciprocal obligation to that of the union‟s.78  Employers must also disclose any payments made 
to employees or to outside labor consultants in an effort to persuade employees to exercise or not 
to exercise their collective rights.
79
  Such payments include those designed to interfere in 
collective rights or to obtain information on employee or union efforts related to a dispute with 
the employer.
80
  Courts have determined that section 203 reflects “the congressional conviction 
that quite without regard to the motives or methods of particular individuals engaging in it, the 
persuader business was detrimental to good labor relations and the continued public interest.”81 
 Regulations regarding the disclosure of such conflict of interest payments are in flux.  
Form LM-30, which covers conflict of interest disclosures for unions, was amended by the 
Department of Labor in 2007.  The revisions increased the disclosures from two pages to nine 
pages and required greater detail on the nature and purpose of the transaction.  However, in 2009 
the Department announced rulemaking proceedings to review the changes to the form.  The 
Department‟s website currently states that “fundamental questions regarding the scope and 
extent of the [2007 amended] reporting obligations are unanswered, and litigation challenging 
some aspects of the form remains pending.”82  Therefore, the Department will accept either the 
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 Id. § 433(a)(1). 
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 Id. § 433(a)(2)-(5). 
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 Id. § 433(a)(4). 
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 Price v. Wirtz, 412 F.2d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 1969). 
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 Office of Labor-Management Standards, Form LM-30 Labor Organization Officer and Employee Report, at: 
http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/GPEA_Forms/blanklmforms.htm#FLM30.   
The website states: 
pre- or the post-2007 form and will not bring enforcement actions based on a failure to use the 
new form.
83
 
5. Example: Local Union 1199, Service Employees International Union 
 Looking at an actual set of disclosures may assist in illuminating the nature and extent of 
those disclosures.  The 2004 LM-2 provided by Local 1199 of the Service Employees 
International Union is one such example;
84
 it is available online through a search of the 
Department of Labor‟s website.85  The 196-page document provides the annual disclosure for 
Local 1199, one of the largest and most successful unions in the country.
86
  According to the 
2004 form, Local 1199 has 240,000 members, roughly $60 million in assets, and roughly $15 
million in liabilities.
87
  Dues range from $13 to $75, with initiation fees ranging from $75 to 
$200.
88
  The union received over $100 million in dues, and total receipts were over $137 million.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Note: The Office of Labor-Management Standards published in the Fall 2009 Semi-Annual 
Regulatory Agenda notice of an intended rulemaking to revise the Form LM-30 (Labor 
Organization Officer and Employee Report).  
See: http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=200910&RIN=1215-AB74. The 
rulemaking is intended to review questions of policy and law surrounding these reporting 
requirements.  The rulemaking will focus on the changes resulting from a 2007 regulatory revision 
of the Form and instructions.  This revision dramatically altered the old Form LM-30 and 
instructions, which had not substantially changed in over 40 years.  Despite the promulgation 
of the new Form LM-30, fundamental questions regarding the scope and extent of the reporting 
obligations are unanswered, and litigation challenging some aspects of the form remains pending. 
In light of this uncertainty, the pending regulatory action, the pending litigation and the continuing 
obligation of union officers and employees pursuant to section 202 of the Labor-Management and 
Reporting Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 432, OLMS has determined that it would not be 
a good use of resources to bring enforcement actions based upon a failure to use a specific form to 
comply with the statutory obligation to report certain financial information.  Accordingly, OLMS 
will refrain from initiating enforcement actions against union officers and union employees based 
solely on the failure to file the report required by section 202, using the 2007 form, as long as 
individuals meet their statutorily-required filing obligation in some manner.  OLMS will accept 
either the old Form LM-30 or the new one for purposes of this non-enforcement policy.  
83
 Id.   
84
 Form LM-2 Labor Organization Annual Report, Local 1199, Service Employees International Union, March 28, 
2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter Local 1199 Form LM-2]. 
85
 The Department of Labor, Office of Labor-Management Standards, maintains a website through which it is 
possible to obtain electronic versions of union annual reports.  Department of Labor, LMRDA Reporting and Public 
Disclosure, at: http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/olms/rrlo/lmrda.htm.  
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 Local 1199 Form LM-2, supra note 82, at 2, 3. 
88
 Id. at 2. 
The LM-2 also provides a breakdown of investments, fixed assets, other assets, sales and 
purchases of investments and assets, and loans payable.
89
 
 The LM-2 also provides a list of all officers as well as their total compensation.  The 
form lists 131 officers who receive a total of over $5 million in total compensation.
90
  Union 
president Dennis Rivera received $147,710 in total compensation for 2004.
91
  The form also 
itemizes all disbursements to employees; each employee is listed by name, title, and total 
compensation.
92
  Finally, there are schedules for benefits, contributions, gifts, grants, office and 
administrative expenses, and other receipts and disbursements.
93
 
C. Employer Disclosure under the Federal Securities Laws 
Perhaps the most comprehensive statutory and regulatory scheme of contractual 
regulation is the federal system of securities regulation.  Even before the New Deal, state blue 
sky laws placed special restrictions on the sale of securities beyond the common law.
94
  The 
Securities Act of 1933
95
 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
96
 then completely reshaped the 
playing field.  They put into place a comprehensive federal system premised on antifraud 
protection and a process of mandatory disclosure.  This scheme, while fleshed out though 
seventy years of amendment, regulation, and judicial opinion, retains relatively the same 
structure with which it began. 
The disclosure requirements mandated by federal regulation are considerably broad.  In 
the context of an initial offering, section 5 of the 1993 Act requires that issuers file a 
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comprehensive registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
97
  Section 7 
of the 1933 Act, along with Schedule A, sets forth the basics of the disclosure requirements and 
also empowers the Commission to establish further disclosure regulations.
98
  Schedule A sets 
forth thirty-two separate provisions of disclosure, including the issuer‟s articles of incorporation 
or other structural documents,
99
 the general character of the issuer‟s business,100 the amount of 
outstanding debt,
101
 remuneration paid to directors and officers,
102
 the security‟s price (or method 
of calculating the price),
103
 items relating to possible conflicts of interest,
104
 a detailed balance 
sheet,
105
 and a profit and loss statement.
106
  The Commission has further refined these 
requirements through a series of forms and further regulations.  The Commission‟s forms break 
down what information must merely be disclosed to the Commission and what information must 
also be provided in the prospectus, a document provided to potential purchasers.
107
  However, 
these forms generally refer to Regulation S-K to define what exactly must be provided.  
Regulation S-K is significantly more detailed than Schedule A, detailing precisely what types of 
quantitative and qualitative information must be disclosed.
108
  For example, Regulation S-K has 
extremely detailed requirements on the disclosure of financial information,
109
 including a special 
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provision on management‟s discussion and analysis of the firm‟s financial condition and results 
of its operations.
110
 
 In the context of a securities offering, federal law integrates the required disclosure 
within an overall process of restrictions on information dissemination.  Section 5(c) of the 1933 
Act prohibits all offers to sell the securities prior to the filing of the registration statement.
111
  
However, the Commission has given an extremely broad definition to the term “offer,” holding 
that any communication reasonably calculated to generate a buying interest is an offer.
112
  After 
the registration materials have been filed, the issue enters the “waiting period” until the 
Commission has made the registration statement effective.  Offers to sell made during the 
waiting period must generally also provide all of the information required in the prospectus.
113
  
Since some of this information may not be available until the offering price has been set, it may 
be impossible to furnish the required prospectus during the waiting period.
114
  The Commission 
thus has made a limited exception to this Catch-22 by allowing “tombstone ads”115 and 
preliminary “red herring” prospectuses.116  Once the waiting period has ended, all written offers 
for sale must be accompanied by a complete prospectus.
117
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 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.134 (2005). 
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117
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2000). 
 Although quite complicated, the registration process is designed to accomplish three 
primary purposes: (1) make material information about the issuer public, (2) require the issuer to 
deliver some of that information to potential investors (through the prospectus), and (3) restrict 
the issuer‟s opportunities to promote its securities outside of these channels.  It does not seem a 
stretch to say that the 1933 Act, and by extension the Commission, are endeavoring to create 
“laboratory conditions” for the sales of securities.  They are trying to get material information to 
the consumer, and at the same time they are limiting opportunities for purchase without such 
information. 
In contrast to the 1933 Act‟s focus on a security‟s initial sale, the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 regulates the sales of securities after they have been issued and are traded on the 
open market.  The 1934 Act establishes a registration and supervision system for national 
securities exchanges
118
 and requires continuing disclosure for companies whose securities trade 
on those markets.
119
  The mandatory disclosure comes in the form of periodic reports: Form 10-
K, an annual report; Form 10-Q, a quarterly report;and Form 8-K, an interim report required in 
limited circumstances.
120
  The 1934 Act also regulates brokers, members, and dealers of the 
exchanges,
121
 and imposes certain requirements with respect to proxy solicitations and tender 
offers.
122
  The SEC also enacted Rule 10b-5, its comprehensive antifraud provision, under 
section10 of the 1934 Act. 
The SEC has been out front in delivering its required disclosure to securities consumers 
and the public.  In 1984 it first developed the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval 
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system known as EDGAR.
123
  EDGAR is an easily-searchable database of all disclosure filings 
made by companies covered by the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
124
  A quick search can retrieve all of a 
company‟s registration statements, prospectuses, and periodic reports filed on Forms 8-K, 10-K, 
and 10-Q.
125
  Since the mid 1990s, EDGAR had been an integral part of the disclosure 
process.
126
  The SEC requires that filers provide their disclosure using the EDGAR Filer Manual, 
now in its fourteenth version.
127
  Access to the disclosure is viewed as a critical part of the SEC‟s 
mission, and the agency frequently tweaks its systems to provide better service.
128
 
Passed in the midst of the bust following the boom of the 1920s, the New Deal securities 
acts aimed at eliminating fraud through greater disclosure and penalties for noncompliance.  
Required disclosure was seen as a way of bringing more “sunlight,” in Brandeis‟ famous phrase, 
into the inner workings of corporate shares.
129
  Preventing fraud was only one end of the 
spectrum, however.  On the other end, proponents and enforcers of the New Deal acts hoped that 
the outflow of information would lead to better pricing and trading on the markets.  The Acts, 
particularly the 1933 Act, were seen as a way of making sure the securities markets acted 
rationally.  In a 1933 article supporting the legislation, William O. Douglas and George E. Bates 
wrote that the effects of the 1933 Act would be: “(1) prevention of excesses and fraudulent 
transactions, which will be hampered and deterred merely by the requirement that their deals be 
revealed; and (2) placing in the market during the early stages of the life of a security a body of 
                                                          
123
 Charles N. Charnas & D. Craig Nordlund, Introduction to Operational EDGAR: An Outline for Electronic Filing 
with the SEC, Practising Law Institute, 875 PLI/Corp. 429, 434 (1995). 
124
 See SEC Filing & Forms (EDGAR), available at: http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml. 
125
 SEC, Researching Public Companies through EDGAR: A Guide for Investors, at: 
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/edgarguide.htm.  
126
 Charnas & Nordlund, supra note 122, at 436-37. 
127
 17 C.F.R. § 232.301 (2010). 
128
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facts which, operating indirectly through investment services and expert investors, will tend to 
produce more accurate appraisal of the worth of the security . . . .”130  Echoing the thoughts of 
Douglas and Bates, the SEC later explained the purpose of the 1933 Act as twofold: 
The Securities Act, often referred to as the „truth in securities‟ Act, was designed 
not only to provide investors with adequate information upon which to base their 
decisions to buy and sell securities, but also to protect legitimate business seeking 
to obtain capital through honest protestation against competition from crooked 
promoters . . . .
131
 
 
PART II.  A NEW MODEL FOR REPRESENTATION ELECTION REGULATION 
This paper seeks to start the conversation about the specifics of a new model for 
regulating the union representation election.  The current system is a strange admixture of 
ambiguous and heavy-handed requirements about what may be said combined with a completely 
hands-off approach to what must be said.  As a result, unions and employers must step carefully 
during the campaign so as to avoid statements or conduct that violate the Board‟s “laboratory 
conditions” doctrine.  At the same time, the Board makes no effort to ensure that employees get 
the information they need to make an economically rational decisionother than to provide unions 
with the names and addresses of those workers whom they are courting.  In order to redesign the 
regulation surrounding the union representation election, I propose four facets to a new 
regulatory model: (a) required disclosure by unions; (b) optional disclosure by employers, if they 
wish to participate in the campaign; (c) a more hands-off approach to regulation, except in the 
case of misrepresentation; and (d) protected space for employee discourse.  These four reforms 
are discussed in more detail below. 
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Exchange Commission 1 (1967) (stating that the New Deal Acts require disclosure so that “investors may make a 
realistic appraisal of the merits of securities and thus exercise an informed judgment in determining whether to 
purchase them”), quoted in George J. Bentson, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC‟s Accounting Disclosure 
Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 23, 24 (Henry G. Manne ed. 
1969). 
A.  Required Union Disclosure 
The union representation election process suffers from informational failures.  
Information is distributed asymmetrically, and unions and employers may lack the proper 
incentives to ensure that employees get the information they need to make the decision.  As in 
the securities regulation context, as well as many other contractual contexts, a system of 
mandatory information disclosure would be useful in ensuring that consumers get relevant 
information. 
What would such a system look like?  My hope is that this piece will begin the debate 
about exactly this question.  Here are a few thoughts about the content of the disclosure, as well 
as the means of delivering that content to employees. 
1. Content 
 What sorts of information are relevant and material to the union representation question?  
The answer may vary by election, by individual, and by time period.  Further empirical research 
would be extremely useful in determining exactly what workers want to know in making their 
decision.
132
  The following categories serve as a starting point in determining what data workers 
might want. 
 (a) Dues and fees.  Obviously, employees would want to know how much their dues 
would be and what initiation fees would be required.  The LMRDA requires disclosure of union 
dues in both the union‟s initial filings and in its annual reports.133  As the Local 1199 SEIU 
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 As discussed earlier, one empirical study discounted the importance of information received by employees during 
the campaign.  See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 62-64 
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 Form LM-1, supra note 45; Form LM-2, supra note 46. 
example demonstrates, however, the union may disclose a range of dues and fees rather than a 
specific amount.  In such cases, employees would want to know exactly how much the union is 
proposing to charge in their particular case. 
Employees may also want a sense of whether those dues are likely to change in the next 
few years.  Given the difficulties of exit, employees are essentially signing up for as much as a 
three-year contract when they agree to union representation.  Although unions may not know 
what their future financial needs will be, they may have information about future dues prices that 
would be useful to the employees‟ decision.  The union could be required to disclose whether 
any dues or fees hikes are set to be voted on by the members, or whether union officials have 
plans for such an increase in the upcoming year. 
 (b) Organizational structure.  Like any organization, potential members generally would 
want to know how the union is structured and what its policies are for members.  The union must 
disclose its constitution and bylaws under the LMRDA.  Form LM-1 asks the union to list such 
information as qualifications for or restrictions on membership, authorization for disbursement of 
funds, the types of audits the labor organization undergoes, the calling of regular and special 
meetings, the selection of officers and stewards, the circumstances under which fines, 
suspensions, or expulsions can be imposed, and the requirements for authorizing bargaining 
demands, contract terms, and strikes.
134
  In addition, members may want to know who the union 
officials are, their backgrounds, and perhaps even their salaries.
135
  Form LM-2 requires the 
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 The question of salaries is likely to provoke some controversy.  On the one hand, corporations are required to 
disclose salary information under federal securities law on the theory that shareholders should know what their 
agents are making.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2006); cf. SEC Release Nos. 33-8655, 34-53185 (January 27, 2006), 
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have the right to see the executive compensation for the company from whom they are buying the services.  To the 
disclosure of officials and disbursements to officials.  Officials could also be required to provide 
a short biography that includes certain specific facts, such as education, work experience, 
criminal record, and time with the union. 
 (c) Nature and Quality of Services.  Perhaps the most important set of information for 
employees would concern the nature and quality of the representation services provided by the 
union.  There is a distinct information asymmetry with respect to information about the union‟s 
services.
136
  Employees who have never belonged to the union do not know how well the union 
will do in negotiating new terms, avoiding strikes, managing grievances, and keeping dues low.  
When buying a product, consumers can often see and handle the product, and they are often 
given the right to return the product if they find it unsatisfactory.  Home buyers hire inspectors, 
tour the home, and still benefit from mandatory disclosure requirements on the part of the seller.  
Union consumers must base their judgment on the information provided during the campaign, 
along with any prior knowledge, opinions, or prejudices they may bring with them to the 
decision. 
 There may be ways to get information about performance to employees making a 
representation decision.  The union‟s past and current collective bargaining agreements provide 
concrete facts about the terms and conditions the union has negotiated for other employees.  
Having access to these contracts would provide a way for workers to comparison-shop.  A more 
speculative form of information would be union predictions about what they expect to negotiate 
with the employer.  The union might present information about what its initial demands would 
be, and it could even provide information about what it expects to get.  It could even disclose the 
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 Bodie, Information, supra note 6, at 47-51. 
risk that the union will not be able to negotiate a contract, or the likelihoodthat the union will call 
the employees out on strike. 
In the world of securities regulation, firms making an initial public offering are required 
to disclose reams of financial information about themselves.
137
  Companies are even expected to 
make predictions about what future events may damage their prospects of being successful in 
business.
138
  One could envision a disclosure statement in which unions provided a richer vision 
of what they expected to achieve and the difficulties they contemplated facing as part of a 
mandatory disclosure statement.  Of course, unions would generally endeavor to be as non-
specific as possible in order to avoid recriminations or liability down the road.  Unions could 
also plausibly argue that such statements would reveal too much of their strategies and would 
enable the employer to get an advantage in bargaining.  As we consider a mandatory disclosure 
regime, the pros and cons of such “softer” statements should be considered alongside the 
disclosure of “harder” financial data. 
 (d) Conflicts of Interest.  The corporate world places a premium on disclosure whenever a 
potential conflict of interest arises between a corporate officer and the corporation he or she 
serves.
139
  Employees are entitled to know about any potential conflict of interest between the 
union and the employer.  Evidence of such a conflict would be any overlap between union 
personnel and the employer‟s personnel, including spouses and other close relatives, or financial 
ties between the union and the employer.
140
  Current or past collective bargaining relationships 
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between the union and the employer (or an associated company) might also be grounds for a 
conflict of interest.  Moreover, any contracts between the employer and its affiliates and the 
union (or its affiliates) should also be disclosed to employees.  They key here would be to have a 
sweep broad enough to encompass all of the potential conflicts.  For example, Teri Moore may 
be president of the United Forever Union (UFU) and may negotiate a fairly employer-friendly 
contract with Blue Industries.  If Teri also is the treasurer for Americans United Union (AUU), 
and AUU is seeking to represent employees of Aquamarine Industries, a subsidiary of Blue 
Industries, then Aquamarine employees should be told about and given access to the UFU 
contract with Blue Industries.  The regulations would have to be written to prevent employers 
and unions from avoiding the disclosure requirements simply by creating new corporations or 
labor organizations.   
But aside from this concern, the Board would easily be able to provide this information to 
employees by piggybacking on top of existing disclosure required.  Unions and employers are 
unlikely to provide this information themselves during the course of the campaign.  In fact, the 
incentives are inverse: the more troublesome the disclosures would be (for both union and 
employer), the less likely they are to be disclosed.
141
  Although industrious employees might find 
these disclosures on their own, the Board would provide a real service by making sure employees 
get this information as part of ensuring that “laboratory conditions” exist. 
2. Delivery 
 Given the plethora of potentially relevant information available to disclose, the Board 
would have to determine the best method for selecting the disclosure and then delivering it to 
employees.  In terms of selecting the information, the Board would face a difficult choice.  On 
                                                          
141
 See Bodie, Information, supra note 6; Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to 
the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010) . 
the one hand, the Board would want to keep the information disclosure as concise as possible, in 
order to make it more accessible to employees.  Concerns about “information overload” have led 
commentators to reexamine the amount of required disclosure in the realm of securities.
142
  On 
the other hand, some employees might be willing to spend the extra time to dig through a larger 
amount of disclosure and would find the extra information useful or even critical in making their 
decision.  Given that union elections can be determined by one employee out of hundreds, it may 
make sense to give the marginal employee as much information as he or she desires. 
 Technology may provide the answer to this dilemma.  The Board could provide for the 
mandatory disclosure in two steps.  The first step would be a short form distributed to all 
employees with a few pieces of critical information included.  The second step would be an 
Internet website, similar to EDGAR, that would provide access to all of the other information the 
Board required to be disclosed.  In this manner, all employees would be given a set of 
disclosures that many would be likely to read.  At the same time, the few more industrious 
employees would have channeled access to important information that may take much longer to 
absorb. 
 The primary issue surrounding the first step would be determining the exact scope of the 
information to be provided.  While the Board would want to gather more information and could 
even consider rulemaking on this issue,
143
 commentators may want to focus on determining what 
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sorts of information employees most want and how to convey that information most concisely.  
Union dues and fees applicable to the voting employees, for example, could be specified briefly.  
Terms and conditions of employment in the union‟s other collective bargaining agreements could 
not.  To some extent, the Board might want to use the short form to tip off employees about 
information they could get through the website.  However, for the most part the Board would 
want to keep the short form as a simple summary of the most critical facts about the union and its 
services. 
 The primary issues surrounding the second step would be the design of the website, the 
costs in implementing the system, and the likelihood that employees would benefit from the 
system.  In terms of the design, this again is an issue for future policy development by the Board.  
It should be fairly straightforward, however, to design a standard page for each election which 
would provide access to the additional sets of information.  The Department of Labor has 
brought its entire LMRDA disclosure system online, making it fairly simple to link to the 
Department of Labor‟s website or even directly link to the particular union‟s disclosure within 
the Department‟s database. 144  Other documents, such as the union‟s past and present collective 
bargaining agreements, could be posted to the page as documents that could be downloaded.  
Moreover, the page could also link to the union‟s website in order to provide access to 
information.  In terms of costs, it is fairly simple to create a webpage, and Board technicians 
could use the same web design for each representation election.
145
  It would be far simpler to 
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 In his commentary on my paper, Harold Maier raised a number of questions with regard to the content and 
mechanics of such a website.  A straightforward template would be necessary to allow the Board‟s regional offices 
post electronic versions of collective bargaining agreements on the web, as opposed to 
photocopying these agreements and distributing them to employees. 
There is some question as to whether employees would use such a system.  However, 
computer ownership and Internet use continue to grow across the country.
146
  Many employees 
have access to the Internet at work.  As many other commentators have suggested, using the web 
is a cost-effective, extremely accessible method of distributing lots of information to a large 
number of employees.
147
  It can overcome the Lechmere access problems that have made it 
difficult for information to reach employees.  Providing unions with access to the employees 
(electronically) together with employee access to mandatory disclosure about the union would 
provide an ideal mix of information to employees. 
B.  Employer Disclosure 
This article has focused primarily on the need for employees to get information about the 
union offering its services.  Given that unions are seeking to provide services on behalf of the 
employees, it makes sense to focus on their dues, internal organization, quality of services and 
potential conflicts of interest.  However, information about the employer is also relevant to the 
representation decision.
148
  Although there is ample ground for further discussion and research, 
this article proposes a system of employer disclosure in which employers would be given an 
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option.  The employer could provide a set of mandatory disclosures and then participate in the 
campaign, or the employer could remain neutral and provide no disclosure.  This option would 
provide employers with a choice.  They could contest the union‟s efforts by putting their own 
cards on the table, or they could stay out of the process entirely. 
What kinds of information would the employer provide?  Again, further research is 
necessary to determine exactly what kinds of employer information are relevant and important to 
making a rational union representation election.  Ties to the union are certainly relevant, and it 
may make sense to impose a duty on the employer to make disclosures about any potential 
conflicts of interest between itself and the union.  The company‟s finances are also relevant, as 
its financial condition may dictate what level of wages and benefits it could provide to 
employees.  Much of the information useful to potential shareholders would also be useful to 
employees contemplating unionization (albeit perhaps for different reasons).  In this regard, the 
Board could piggyback off disclosures made by publicly-traded companies to the SEC. The 
Board could provide a link to the employer‟s EDGAR disclosures through the election website, 
just as it would link to union disclosures at the website as well. 
This system of optional disclosure would have two policy objectives.  The first would be 
to increase the availability and accessibility of information about the employer to employees.  
The second objective would be to put a premium on employer participation within the campaign.  
As noted above, perhaps the primary justification for employer involvement in the union 
campaign is the employer‟s role in providing negative information about the union to employees.  
A system of mandatory union disclosure would weaken that justification.  If the regime of 
disclosure is comprehensive enough, perhaps employers could be ushered completely out of the 
election process, leading to a de jure system of employer neutrality.
149
  Such a system, however, 
would have to overcome complicated free speech and informational concerns.  A system of 
optional disclosure would put a price on participation – a price rationally related to 
representation election regulation. 
C.  Reconfiguring Campaign Regulation 
 The Board‟s regime of representation election regulation has long been criticized for its 
indeterminate and hair-splitting standards.  Since the Board has not been all that concerned with 
managing the information in the campaign, the proposed system of disclosure would not 
necessarily affect the Board‟s prohibitions on coercion, bribery, or inflammatory appeals; such 
regimes could coexist.  At the same time, a new disclosure regime might provide an opportunity 
for the Board to reexamine the current prohibitions and adopt a simpler, more streamlined 
system.  If the union and employer are providing critical information to the employees up front, 
then perhaps employees will place less emphasis on the information they learn from the 
participants during the campaign.  However, given the different purposes of much of the Board‟s 
regulation, perhaps there need not be any changes to the Board‟s efforts to regulate speech and 
conduct that has the tendency to coerce employees in the exercise of their choice. 
 However, there is one reform that would substantially supplement and strengthen the 
disclosure regime: penalties for misrepresentation and fraud.  Unlike perhaps every other regime 
of commercial regulation, the Board‟s regulation of the union representation election does not 
penalize for fraud.  This failure is anathema to the need for employees to trust the information 
they are getting from unions and employers.  Required disclosures would be useless if there are 
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no penalties for failures or misrepresentations in those disclosures.  The Board should, at the 
least, treat material misrepresentations as grounds for overturning an election, and it should treat 
any error or omission in the mandatory disclosure as per se material.  The Board could also 
consider stronger penalties such as monetary damages or injunctive relief.  In making a union 
representation decision, employees should be protected against fraud as consumers generally are 
when making economic decisions.
150
  Fraud should not be tolerated. 
D. Providing Space for Employee Discourse  
 In the 1980s, the SEC saw the opportunity for a new approach to disclosure and public 
access to that disclosure.  In developing the EDGAR system, the SEC has changed the ability of 
shareholders, prospective shareholders, and the markets as a whole to have easy access to critical 
information.
151
  The NLRB, on the other hand, has been generally reluctant to engage in changes 
based on new technological possibilities.
152
  Perhaps most (in)famously, the Board has made it 
very easy for employers to prohibit union email solicitations or other communication while 
permitting employees to engage in virtually every other kind of non-work-related exchanges.
153
  
Rather than using the new medium to provide for greater access to information and 
communication, the Board relied on traditional property law analysis to shut down a potential 
avenue of growth. 
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 Professor Jeffrey Hirsch has been a consistent and thoughtful advocate for ways in which 
the Board can use electronic technologies to improve the functioning of the NLRA.
154
  In a 
recent paper, Hirsch argues that the Board needs to do more to encourage employee discourse.
155
  
Given the difficulties inherent in collective action, Hirsch points out that the Board cannot 
assume that providing a limited avenue for communication is sufficient.  Instead, the Board 
needs to take steps to encourage employee discourse.  Among his suggestions are not only 
striking down employer restrictions on employee communications, but also providing for more 
structured discourse during election campaigns as well as notices to employees about their 
rights.
156
  A disclosure regime would be an important addition to Hirsch‟s discourse model.  It 
would provide a baseline of information from which further discussion could spring.  As Hirsch 
points out, “a meaningful right of collective action requires employees to have enough 
information to exercise that right.”157  I would encourage the NLRB to look to the example of the 
SEC in matching a system of information disclosure with the technological means to make the 
information easily accessible to those who need it.   
As part of the disclosure websites discussed in Part II(A)(2), the Board could also provide 
for virtual discussion areas for employees to “meet” electronically and discuss collective 
employee issues.  These areas could be discussion boards, blogs, or even virtual space in online 
worlds such as Second Life.
158
  Such electronic meeting places would provide employees with a 
neutral space in which to carry on the discourse necessary to collective bargaining.  Such spaces 
could be employees only, or unions and employers might have limited access to the space to 
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facilitate the dialogue.  There is ample evidence that employees are using these spaces already in 
the context of their work life and their personal life.  It would be a natural extension for many 
employees to engage in workplace discourse electronically.
159
  Employing technology creatively 
could give the Board an invigorated role in workplace life in the new century. 
E. Intended Effects of the New Regime 
 In laying out a framework for reform, I wish to conclude by talking about the two general 
goals of these reforms – two effects they should endeavor to create.  First, the disclosure regime 
should highlight many of the more egregious conflicts of interest between labor organizations 
and employers.  If ties between the union and company are highlighted for employees, 
employees will be in a much better position to police such ties.  Second, a more rational and 
organized system of information regulation will help employees make more informed and 
rational decisions.  And to the extent that employees could better trust the information they are 
getting, they may feel more comfortable to committing themselves to union membership.  
Certainly, better information could lead to the result that even fewer employees decide to join 
unions.  But whatever the result, a system of disclosure would provide employees with the tools 
to better evaluate the decisions before them.  In the long run, more rational decisions will mean 
more efficient ones, which will ultimately leave society better off.   
CONCLUSION 
 The Board, courts, and academic commentators have (with good reason) focused on 
employer coercion and administrative delay as key concerns in the regulation of the union 
representation election.  However, the critical role of information – information necessary to 
make an efficient representation decision – has been neglected.  This paper argues for a new 
approach to representation elections: one that creates disclosure requirements for both unions and 
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employers, as well as one that empowers the Board to manage the flow of information to 
employees.  At the least, this new approach will help prevent conflicts of interest that despoil the 
relationship between a union and its members.  However, such a process may ultimately lead to a 
newly invigorated market for representation driven by a wiser, more informed class of 
employees. 
 
 
